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The Hidden Dichotomy in the Law of Morality
INTRODUCTION
It appears that United States Supreme Court Associate Justice
Antonin Scalia has joined the ranks of the doomsday prophets. Scalia
intimates a dark future in his vivid and spirited dissent to the Supreme
Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas.' For example, in Scalia's
post-Lawrence dystopia it would be perfectly acceptable for prostitutes
to participate in "Take Your Daughter to Work Day."2 No one would
bat an eye at incestuous brothers getting married while their sister and
her two husbands perform sex acts.3 In this promiscuous world, the
government would have no right to enforce any law based on the
state's interest in preserving or promoting morality. Scalia's dissent
implies that when Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, tore down
the moral bulwark in Lawrence, he set the nation on a downward spiral
of decadence and immorality unseen since Sodom and Gomorrah.4
But all is not as Scalia fears. A careful reading of American juris-
prudence reveals that hidden within the states' so-called interest in
protecting morality, there is a dichotomy between the unconstitutional
imposition of religious morality and the proper and necessary protec-
tion of the civil morality. Rather than annihilating the states' right to
enforce laws on the basis of any form of morality, 5 Kennedy's opinion
in Lawrence carefully excised and prohibited statutes based merely on
religious morality, while leaving the states' ability to enforce laws
based on civil morality untouched.6
This Comment will begin by exploring the dichotomy itself, and
then carefully distinguishing civil and religious morality. The analy-
sis will then examine Lawrence and clarify how the opinion affected
the dichotomy. Next, this Comment will apply the post-Lawrence
understanding of the rational basis test to several issues of concern
raised by opponents of the decision. 7 Finally, this Comment will spec-
1. 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. See id. at 590.
3. See id.
4. Genesis 19:1-38.
5. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590.
6. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
7. Susan Austin Blazier, The Irrational Use of the Rational Basis Review in
Lawrence v. Texas: Implications for Our Society, 26 CAMPBELL L. REv. 21 (2004)
(discussing likely implications of the Lawrence decision).
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ulate as to the possible implications of Lawrence for moral issues lying
on the horizon.
I. THE MoRAL DICHOTOMY
Morality as a concept can be loosely divided into two discrete cat-
egories: that derived from religious doctrine on the one hand, and that
which is universal to all human societies, regardless of religious faith,
on the other.8 Given that there are many religions represented both
throughout the world and within the United States, morality derived
from religion cannot be universal. However, there are certain universal
principles present in all religions which serve as a common thread
throughout. These common threads are portions of what this Com-
ment will refer to as the "civil morality."
While there is some controversy surrounding this dichotomy, it
has precedent in American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that certain public rituals that have a religious flavor,
such as opening each session of Congress with a prayer, are in fact
neutral civil rituals rather than religious acts.9 Indeed, the Court has
drawn a distinction between true religion and custom-driven "civil
religion," which is dogmatically neutral.'
This separation of morality into two divisions is critical to the
interplay between preserving First Amendment religious freedoms and
Fourth Amendment privacy rights on the one hand, and the states'
interest in promoting morality on the other." The Constitution's pro-
hibition on the establishment of religion makes it imperative that laws
are not based on religious foundations. Religion, while an integral
part of human experience, lends itself too easily to absolutes that can
exclude legitimate minority practices.12
A. Religious Morality
Religious morality takes its authority from the commands of a
higher power, and is considered to bear the weight of a deity's will by
8. BASIL MITCHELL, MORALITY: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR 7-8 (2000).
9. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
10. Id. at 793 n.14.
11. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(explaining that religious morality is not part of the government's sphere).
12. Jonathan Fox, Religious Discrimination: A World Survey, 61 J. INT'L AFF. 1, 47-48
(2007) (discussing the increase of religious discrimination and international
intervention).
592 [Vol. 31:591
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adherents of the particular belief system involved. 13 It encourages
individuals to behave morally because a higher power wishes it of
them. 4 This is in contrast to acting because it is the objectively cor-
rect thing to do. These religious imperatives involve tenets specific to
each faith and rely on highly particularized sets of behavioral com-
mandments. Examples from various religions include the Judeo-Chris-
tian Ten Commandments given to Moses, 5 Islam's Five Pillars, 16 the
Hindu Bhagavad Gita, 17 the Wiccan Rede,' 8 and Buddhism's Eight-
Fold Path.19 Each of these formulas prescribes specific conduct, but
each approaches this conduct differently. While there are commonali-
ties between them, critical contradictions-each legitimate in their own
right-create conflict.
Because religious morality commands uniform behavior, often
backed by some form of eternal punishment or reward, it encourages
civil order and enables human beings to interact with some degree of
security.2 0 Each knows that the other is, at least theoretically,
prompted by the same moral imperatives. In turn, this security allows
civilization to emerge and economies to develop, secure in the knowl-
edge that each person labors under the same moral compulsions as his
or her neighbor.
At least, this would be the case in a homogenous or theocratic
society. For better or for worse the United States is neither. American
political leaders are not spiritual leaders. While it is true that some
spiritual leaders do serve as political leaders, they do not obtain their
political positions by virtue of their religious positions. 2' Indeed,
America's pluralism is demonstrated by the various religions and
denominations represented in the Presidency, Congress, and the
13. See Pascal Boyer, Functional Origins of Religious Concepts: Ontological and
Strategic Selection in Evolved Minds, 6 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 195, 195
(2000).
14. See id.
15. Exodus 20:1-13.
16. Qu'ran 2:184.
17. The Bhagavad-Gita in English, http://www.bhagavad-gita.org/index-english.
html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
18. Religious Tolerance.org, The Wiccan Rule of Behavior: The "Wiccan Rede"
[hereinafter Wiccan Redel, http://www.religioustolerance.org/wicrede.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2009).
19. Fundamental Buddhism, Noble Eightfold Path, http://www.fundamental
buddhism.com/noble-eightfold-path.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
20. Amitai Etzioni, Religion and Social Order, 148 POL'Y REV. 59, 60-62 (2008).
21. Mike Huckabee, for instance, was both governor of Arkansas and an ordained
Baptist minister. MikeHuckabee.com, Biography, http://www.mikehuckabee.com/
index.cfm?fa=home.Biography (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
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Supreme Court. For example, former President Kennedy, 2 Justice
Scalia 23 and Senator John Kerry24 are all Catholic; Justice Ginsburg25
and Senators Joseph Lieberman 6 (I-CT) and Charles Schumer2 7 (D-
NY) are Jewish; former President George W. Bush2 8 is a practicing
Methodist; Representative Keith Ellison 29 (D-MN) is Muslim; Represen-
tative Pete Stark30 (D-CA) is an avowed Atheist; Representative Hank
Johnson 3 1 (D-GA) is Buddhist; and Senator Orrin Hatch 32 (R-UT) is
Mormon. Indeed, President Kennedy took great pains to lay to rest
fears that a Catholic president would be obligated to the Pope for pol-
icy decisions. 3
Given the pluralistic nature of the United States and the internal
divisions within each religion, issues immediately arise as to which
morality applies. For example, do we apply Christian morality? What
about Hindu or Shinto? The United States, after all, is home to nearly
as many religions as exist in the world. In a self-identification survey,
American Christians claimed membership in at least thirty-five sepa-
22. The White House, Biography of John F. Kennedy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
about/presidents/johnfkennedy/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
23. The Oyez Project, Antonin Scalia, http://www.oyez.org/justices/antonin_
scalia/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
24. JohnKerry.com, About John Kerry, http://www.johnkerry.com/pages/about/
(last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
25. The Oyez Project, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, http://www.oyez.org/justices/ruth
baderginsburg (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
26. Congress.org, Sen. Joseph Lieberman Biography, http://congress.org/
congressorg/bio/id/688 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
27. Congress.org, Sen. Charles Schumer Biography, http://www.congress.org/bio/
id/402 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
28. Alan Cooperman, Openly Religious, to a Point, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2004, at
A01.
29. Re-Elect Keith Ellison for U.S. Cong., About Keith, http://www.keithellison.org/
about.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
30. Secular Coal. for Am., Congressman Holds No God-Belief (Mar. 12, 2007),
http://www.secular.org/news/pete stark_070312.html.
31. Congress.org, Rep. Henry Johnson Biography, http://www.congress.org/bio/
id/51420 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
32. Congress.org, Sen. Orrin Hatch Biography, http://www.congress.org/bio/id/
586 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
33. Susan Jacoby, Obama the Unchurched: It Was Good Enough for Lincoln, WASH.
POST, June 4, 2008, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/susanjacoby/
2008/06/untitledl.html (quoting President Kennedy's famous statement that, "I do
not speak for my church on public matters-and the church does not speak for me."
President John F. Kennedy, Address to the Ministerial Association of Greater Houston
(Sept. 12, 1960)).
[Vol. 31:591
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rate denominations.34 Additionally, the same survey identified
twenty-one other major religions and five types of secular moral
codes. 35 The vast religious diversity in the United States, like the eth-
nic diversity that fueled the economic boom of the industrial revolu-
tion, is one of the great pillars of our national stability.36
Several examples of laws based on religious morality existed at
one time or another in this country. Prior to the Lawrence decision,
sodomy laws in Texas and Georgia represented an attempt to impose a
religious view regarding sex on the states' residents.37 There was no
legitimate non-religious interest being furthered by these laws.38 The
only plausible explanation was an interest in forcing people to adhere
to a certain religious view.39 Additionally, medical evidence of the
health risks in homosexual relationships is inconclusive and contra-
dictory.4 ° Most studies showing a correlation are funded by funda-
mentalist Christian groups. 4'
The morality in this country most often cited by legislative bodies
and courts has been that propounded in the Old Testament of the
Judeo-Christian Bible. 42 The vast majority of Americans adhere to one
34. See BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 12
(2001), available at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/researchbriefs/aris.pdf.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Etzioni, supra note 20, at 60.
37. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a)-(b) (1984) ("A person commits the offense of
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another .... A person convicted of the offense of
sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20
years."), invalidated by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 21.01(1), 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) (criminalizing "deviate sexual intercourse with
another individual of the same sex," where deviate sexual intercourse is defined as
"any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person" or "the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with
an object"), invalidated by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
38. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
39. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539
U.S. 558.
40. Franklyn N. Judson et al., Comparative Prevalence Rates of Sexually Transmitted
Diseases in Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 112 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 836 (1980),
available at http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/112/6/836 (discussing
the finding that heterosexual men have a significantly higher rate of STD infection for
more diseases than homosexual men).
41. Sara Diamond, The Christian Right's Anti-Gay Agenda, BNET, July 1994, http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1374/is-n4-v54/ai_15493650.
42. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2339, 2340.
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form or another of Christianity. 43 Two key problems arise when
attempting to impose laws based on Judeo-Christian morality on soci-
ety: First, there is no clear consensus as to what constitutes the Judeo-
Christian ethic.44 Second, even if there were a consensus, it is not at
all clear that applying religious morality through the states' police
powers would survive First Amendment analysis.4 5
When the United States Census Bureau did a self-identification
survey on religion in America, thirty-five separate varieties of Christi-
anity alone were identified.46 Within Judaism-the other half of the
Judeo-Christian equation-there are at least three major divisions in
the United States. 47 Within these groups there are significant differ-
ences on substantive moral issues.48 Some Christian and Jewish
groups tolerate homosexual conduct, while others in both categories
view it as an abomination. 49 Additionally, there is significant variation
as to the seriousness of certain breaches of the moral code5 ° and how
God views the transgressor.
Even if the beliefs were more uniform, there is significant uncer-
tainty as to whether basing laws on the morality of a particular relig-
ious group would be permissible under the First Amendment's
prohibition on the establishment of religion. 51 Requiring that all
American citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs-or lack
thereof-adhere to the guidelines set down by the religion of one group
could be considered an establishment of religion. Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has become a quagmire of oftentimes conflicting
tests. However, what is clear is that the existence of a religious pur-
43. KOSMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 12.
44. TOM W. SMITH, JEWISH DISTINCTIVENESS IN AMERICA: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 48-
49 (2005), available at http://www.ajc.org/atf/cf/{42D75369-D582-4380-8395-
D25925B85EAF}/JewishDistinctivenessAmerica TS-April2005.pdf.
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ); see also Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-26 (1963) ("The test may be
stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.").
46. KosMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 12.
47. SMITH, supra note 44, at 3.
48. Id. at 46-51.
49. Id. at 127.
50. Id. at 123-30.
51. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can .... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another.").
596 [Vol. 31:591
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pose behind a law can often constitute an establishment within the
meaning of the Constitution.52 When the government overtly chooses
to base a law on religious morality, it necessarily chooses a particular
religion as a guide point. This adoption of a particular viewpoint-
often necessarily to the exclusion of others-places the government in
seriously unsteady constitutional terrain.53
As children of the Enlightenment, the Founding Fathers surely did
not intend for any religion-even the majority religion-to be imposed
on the minority who believed differently. 54 This rings true especially
in light of serious academic doubts regarding whether the Founding
Fathers themselves intended the United States to be a Christian repub-
lic. 55 In the Treaty of Tripoli, for instance, Article XI declares:
As the government of the United States of America is not in any sense
founded on the Christian religion; as it has in itself no character of
enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility [sic], of [Muslims]; and
as the said States never have entered into any war or act of hostility
against any [Muslim] nation, it is declared by the parties that no pre-
text arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption
of the harmony existing between the two countries.56
George Washington was President 57 at the time of the treaty's
negotiation, and it was his administration that determined the word-
ing. By the time the Senate-populated by the Ratification genera-
tion-approved the treaty, John Adams had been elected as the nation's
second President and subsequently signed the treaty into law. Under
the Constitution, such treaties are considered the supreme law of the
land,58 and thus it is unlikely the Founders would have allowed this
wording to remain in the treaty if it did not accurately reflect their
sentiments.
B. Civil Morality
In contrast to religious morality, civil morality is composed of
those principles that exist within, and independent of, the various reli-
52. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
53. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
54. FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA
(2006).
55. Id. at 11.
56. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Tripoli, art. XI, Nov. 4, 1796, 8 Stat. 154.
57. President Washington served from 1789-1797. The White House, Biography of
George Washington, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewash
ington/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
58. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
20091
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gions of the country. 59 These maxims are found all over the world, in
various cultures, regardless of the predominant faith traditions or the
degree of contact with the rest of the world. 60 The civil morality is
comprised of the mutual interests that each individual has in ensuring
that he or she is free from the interference of others. 6' When societies
are formed, this ethic is given life as each participant gives up whatever
rights he or she does not wish his or her neighbor to have.62
This universal morality might arise from any number of non-spiri-
tual sources. For instance, a stable and reliable means of maintaining
a social group would aid in the protection of young members and the
group as a whole. 63 A moral system, in biological terms, would there-
fore be evolutionarily beneficial because it would allow for consistent
societal systems designed to prolong life and promote reproduction.64
Over time, moral imperatives that served these purposes would be
retained while those that failed would be discarded.65
Socially speaking, the more likely that one individual could antici-
pate the actions of his or her neighbor, then the more likely that social
advancement would follow. 6 6 When individuals are able to focus on
improvements, rather than merely survival, the entire group is bene-
fited. 67 In the moral context, where a moral code promotes a physi-
cally safe environment with predictable outcomes for social
interaction, such improvements become much more commonplace. 68
American courts have shown an understanding of this ethic by
recognizing the states' rights to promote public health,69 to prevent
59. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 7-8.
60. Id. at 42.
61. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 133 (Kessinger Publishing 2004)
(1690).
62. Id. at 133-34.
63. See Jody M. Ganiban et al., Stability and Change in Temperament During
Adolescence, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 222, 223 (2008).
64. CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 93-97 .M. Dent & Sons 1909) (1859)
(discussing how factors promoting the ability to reproduce and sustain population are
retained while factors detracting are discarded).
65. See id.
66. See R.G. Wahler & J.E. Dumas, Maintenance Factors in Coercive Mother-Child
Interactions: The Compliance and Predictability Hypotheses, 19 J. APPLIED BEHAV.
ANALYSIS 13, 15 (1986) (explaining that high levels of unpredictability in social
interactions with children can cause higher levels of aggressiveness and instability).
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., Pharm. Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 586 F.2d. 953 (2d Cir. 1978)
(providing the state has an interest in regulating prescription drugs).
[Vol. 31:591598
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physical and emotional harm,70 to promote fair dealing between citi-
71727zens, to promote good order,7 2 and to promote social cohesion. 3
Together, these individual interests amalgamate into a civil morality
that the state governments have every right to enforce through their
police powers without fear of running afoul of the First Amendment.
Preventing physical and emotional harm is at the heart of any
moral system. A society without some guarantee of physical well-being
cannot be stable enough to support the institutions-such as farming,
economics, and industry-necessary to maintain a civilization. This
universal principle is mirrored in religious dogmas from "[t]hou shalt
not kill" in the Ten Commandments,7 4 to "[a]n' it harm none" in the
Wiccan Rede."5 This also holds true for the underpinnings of the pub-
lic health interest, where epidemiological and defensive considerations
demand a healthy population.
Religious morality is an attempt to co-opt these principals and
attach teleological implications to them. In order to ensure that these
imperatives are met, religious morality attaches some form of ultimate
punishment or reward to various actions. For the civil morality, con-
siderations of an afterlife-with its attendant religious complication-
are replaced with practical goals in the here and now. Since the civil
morality, unlike the religious, is really a pure aggregation of other legit-
imate rights, a court can uphold a law based on civil morality even in
the face of the Lawrence decision.
II. WHAT LAWRENCE DID SAY
Justice Kennedy's main focus in the Lawrence majority opinion
was on the liberty interest individuals retained under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 In the context of sodomy
laws, this liberty interest is grounded in the idea that, because of its
70. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing a
state's interest in the preservation of human life).
71. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937) (upholding
minimum wage standards).
72. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (providing regulation
of nude dancing establishments permissible based on secondary effects).
73. See, e.g., Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (discussing how a state's
legitimate interest in family sanctity is rooted in tradition).
74. Exodus 20:1-13.
75. Wiccan Rede, supra note 18.
76. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (stating that the question
presented was "[w]hether petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual
intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
2009]
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constitutional difficulties, promoting religious morality is not a legiti-
mate interest of the state, and therefore cannot support an infringe-
ment on due process rights.77
This concept is borne out by Kennedy's recitation of Justice Ste-
vens's dissenting position in the landmark Bowers v. Hardwick78 case
that, "[Tlhe fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... -79 This statement reso-
nates well with the division between religious and civil morality. The
morality of a mere majority cannot be civil morality, because civil
morality is composed of those universal principles common to all cul-
tures and religions."' The civil morality is therefore universal rather
than majoritarian. A majority cannot legitimately impose its religious
imperatives on a dissenting minority without a showing that the
minority's actions violate the civil morality.
Religious morality, by contrast, is composed of the beliefs of a
particular group of adherents."' This means that so long as there is
more than one set of beliefs in practice, the religious morality can
never be universal, but only representative of either a majority or
minority. Therefore, since the majority-but by no means all-of Texas
citizens supported the moral legislation banning private consensual
sodomy at issue in Lawrence, this religious moral interest cannot be a
legitimate state interest sufficient to overcome the substantive due pro-
cess requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 2 Instead, the major-
ity must show that the practice in some way violates the interests
comprising the civil morality.
By relying on Justice Stevens's denial of the majority's right to
impose its religious morality on all citizens, the opinion of the Court in
Lawrence merely made a longstanding judicial trend explicit; 3
namely, that while enforcing those discrete state interests that make up
77. See id. at 574, 577-78.
78. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S.
558.
79. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Definition of Morality (Feb. 11,
2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/.
81. MITCHELL, supra note 8.
82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
83. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that a state's refusal to
fund medically necessary abortions could be justified on secular grounds, and
therefore did not violate the First Amendment's No Establishment Clause); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (stating that Sunday Blue Laws could be maintained
on basis of civil tradition, but not religious theology).
[Vol. 31:591
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the civil morality is acceptable, imposing religious dogma on the entire
population is not. 4 It seems then that Justice Scalia's real worry is the
exclusion of religion from the realm of government policy, rather than
the bleak future of ethical decay he foretells.85
The Texas statute at issue in Lawrence furthered no legitimate
state interest in promoting civil morality.8 6 Private, consensual sex
acts between adults do not cause physical or emotional harm to the
participants or others when there is no violence involved. They do not
expose children to concepts outside their developmental range because
children are not exposed to them at all. They do not incite public
unrest because their private nature keeps them from the public eye. In
light of this, Lawrence rightly tells the states that they cannot merely
prohibit conduct because the Bible's Book of Leviticus, 7 or any relig-
ious text for that matter, tells them they should.
III. WHAT LAWRENCE DID NOT SAY
What the Lawrence Court did not do was completely obliterate the
government's ability to make laws based on an interest in promoting
morality. As discussed above, the civil morality is alive and well in
American jurisprudence, as subsequent court decisions show.88 Yet,
beginning with Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, there has been a
stream of law review articles and other writings decrying the end of all
morals legislation and the sure slide of American culture into the
gutter.8 9
Such moral alarmism is a common trend when society makes big
moral changes. Emancipation, desegregation, and interracial marriage
were once decried as diluting the moral purity of the white majority.90
84. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-26 (1963). See
cases cited supra note 83.
85. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 569 (majority opinion).
87. Leviticus 18:22.
88. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145-47 (2007) (basing the legitimacy of
partial birth abortion bans on civil morality concepts of protecting viable fetuses from
physical harm rather than religious concepts).
89. See, e.g., Blazier, supra note 7 (discussing likely implications of the Lawrence
decision).
90. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board: 50 Years Later, HUMAN., Mar./
Apr. 2004, available at http://www.neh.gov/news/humanities/2004-03/brown.html
("[Alabama's former Governor George] Wallace declared in his inaugural address: 'In
the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the
dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny and I say segregation now,
segregation tomorrow, segregation forever."').
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Legalizing birth control was considered the first step toward ultimate
moral decay, and women's suffrage was heralded as the death knell of
the traditional American family.9 And yet the United States was made
stronger and freer by each of these decisions.
An examination of the most common claims made by critics
shows that the controversy over Lawrence is likewise no more than
moral alarmism.
A. Incest
One of the most visceral reactions to the Lawrence decision was
Scalia's assertion that states no longer have the power to ban conduct
such as incest.9 2 Critics argue that since Lawrence held that private
conduct between consenting adults is protected by the Due Process
Clause, a state can only ban this type of conduct if the ban is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.93 Therefore, since Lawrence said
that a state's interest in morality is not a legitimate interest upon which
to base an intrusion, incest between consenting adults, occurring in
private, must be allowed.
This argument overlooks two critical points. First, while a state
may not have a legitimate interest in preventing incest on religious
moral grounds, there is a legitimate interest in preventing physical and
emotional harm, which is a part of civil morality. Second, also bound
up in civil morality is a state's interest in promoting public health.
In his dissent from the Bowers majority in 1986, Justice Blackmun
noted that even in apparently consensual incestuous relationships, the
consent factor is highly suspect. 94 Because of the extremely close sta-
tus relationship which already exists between the parties involved,
there is very likely to be coercion on the part of the individual in the
position of greater familial power (such as the parent or the older sib-
ling). This likelihood of coercion is parallel to the presumption made
in some states' statutory rape provisions with regard to teachers and
other custodial parties. 95 Because the issue becomes one of consent,
this falls squarely under the prevention of emotional and physical
91. Women's Rights, HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG., Nov. 1853, at 838, available at
http://www.assumption.edu/whw/WomansRightsHarpers.html ("But this unblushing
female Socialism defies alike apostles and prophets. In this respect no kindred
movement is so decidedly infidel, so rancorously and avowedly anti-biblical.").
92. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 209 n.4 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
95. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-73a(a)(6)-(8) (2007); IowA CODE
§ 709.4(2)(c)(3) (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7(b) (2007).
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harm component of civil morality. Inability to consent to intimate
contact can have an extremely harmful emotional impact; therefore,
states have a legitimate interest in preventing it.
9 6
Although there is some debate over the exact extent, there is signif-
icant scientific evidence to support the belief that incestuous mating
can produce children with a higher rate of substantial birth defects.97
This increased rate could justify a state's interest in prohibiting incest
because of the avoidable increased burden on the state's health and
welfare systems. One of the key dangers of incestuous reproduction is
the dramatically increased likelihood of inheriting identical recessive
genes.98 Many deformities are the result of characteristics created
when extremely rare recessive genes are allowed to express them-
selves. 99 This is also true for vulnerabilities to developing congenital
conditions and resistance to disease.' 00 If incest were allowed to
become widespread, then states would be faced with severe public
health issues.
Critics of this justification point out that the statistical chances of
birth defects can be reduced by genetic screening or birth control. 10 1
However, this solution raises the specter of eugenics, where states
become, essentially, a genetic police officer. In this scenario, when a
related couple wanted to reproduce, they would be required to undergo
genetic screening. If a likely complication were found, the state would
be placed in the position of forbidding the couple from reproducing,
which raises further liberty concerns.'0 2
B. Polygamy
The second issue raised by critics of Lawrence is polygamy. They
argue that since Lawrence abandoned morality as a justification for
banning conduct, states can no longer ban multi-party marriages. In
our post-Lawrence understanding of the law of morality, abstract ideas
96. See Sue Stuart-Smith, Teenage Sex, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 390, 390 (1996), available
at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/312/7028/390 (discussing the negative
psychological effects resulting from sex without capacity to consent).
97. A.H. Bittles, Consanguinity and Its Relevance to Clinical Genetics, 60 CLINICAL
GENETICS 89, 92-93 (2001).
98. Id. at 92.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 89.
101. Id. at 92.
102. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (discussing the
fundamental status of the right to procreate and the potential for abuse in government
sterilization programs).
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of religious dogma are not a sufficient justification to ban conduct. 10 3
However, the building block interests of civil morality still survive.
Banning polygamy is still very much within the State's power.
One of the fundamental pieces of the civil morality is the promo-
tion of social cohesion.1 0 4 Because society is made up of multiple fam-
ily units, social cohesion is based in large part on protecting the family
structure. Therefore, states have a legitimate interest in regulating the
marital relationship. In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held
that the right to marry the person of one's choice is a fundamental
right. 10 5 Implicit in that assertion is the idea that there is one individ-
ual with whom we are destined to be united. Marriage is, at a funda-
mental level, a declaration of monogamous commitment. Polygamy
clearly does not fit within this definition of disciplined monogamy,
and therefore the state is well within the limits of the civil morality to
prohibit it.
Indeed, if a state was to allow polygamous unions, it would be
difficult to rationally limit the practice. A state could not say that only
the man or only the woman was permitted to take additional spouses.
Neither could a state rationally limit the number of spouses each could
take. Multiple, after all, does not carry any sort of inherent limit. This
could lead to serious consent issues. Imagine a scenario where Alan
marries Betty and Catherine. Betty then marries Dan and Eugene, and
Catherine marries Frank and George. Now imagine that each of the
men takes additional wives, who take additional husbands, ad infin-
itum. Alan is now bound by potential legal obligations to Dan, Frank,
Eugene, George, and their potential future spouses, all-quite possi-
bly-without Alan even knowing they exist.
C. Bestiality
Bestiality is very clearly still within a state's power to regulate fol-
lowing the Lawrence decision. Religion 10 6 aside, there are two sepa-
rate grounds to which prohibitions of bestiality rationally relate.
These are subsumed within the civil morality. The first is a state's
interest in promoting public health, and the second is a state's interest
in preventing physical and emotional harm.
103. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
104. ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 300-543 (Richard
McKeon ed., 1947) (discussing Aristotle's belief that the purpose of civil morality is
the creation of a cohesive social body, or polis).
105. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
106. Leviticus 18:22 ("Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is
abomination.").
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Health is seriously implicated by the high rate of disease transmis-
sion between humans and mammals capable of intercourse with
humans. Indeed, the more closely the animal resembles human
beings, physiologically, the more likely disease is to jump species. 10 7
Logically, for compatibility reasons, those engaging in bestiality are
much more likely to choose animals that more physiologically resem-
ble a human. This makes the risk of disease transmission much more
likely than it would be otherwise.'0 8 A state has a strong interest in
promoting public health and therefore could easily ban bestiality on
this ground alone.
Emotional and physical well-being concerns have also been
extended to animals under cruelty-to-animal statutes. 10 9 Cruelty stat-
utes have been enacted in most states because suffering-including
animal suffering-should never occur absent extreme justifying cir-
cumstances, 1" 0 and because society recognizes that the act of cruelty
has a negative effect on the abuser."' Those who abuse animals
become desensitized to the cruelty, and are much more likely to trans-
fer such actions to human victims." 2 Because of this recognition,
states have a legitimate interest in preventing the physical and emo-
tional harm to animals caused by bestiality because this prevention in
turn protects the human members of society. These concerns clearly
satisfy the rational relation test and are not destroyed by Lawrence.
IV. ISSUES ON THE HORIZON
Even though critics have tended to focus on the above objections,
there are several other areas of potential concern. Same-sex marriage
and adoption issues are looming on the horizon, and it is likely that
the decision in Lawrence will play a crucial role in their disposition.
Similarly, there are potential implications for longstanding issues of
107. Kenneth Rosenman, Zoonoses-Animals Can Make You Sick, NASD, Apr. 2002,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nasd/docs/dOOO701-dOO0800/dOO0752/d00752.
pdf.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 717.1A (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360 (2007); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. xiii, § 352 (2000).
110. See Luis E. Chiesa, Why Is It a Crime to Stomp a Goldfish?-Harm, Victimhood
and the Structure of Anti-Cruelty Offenses, 78 Miss. LJ. 1, 40-58 (2008).
111. Michael D. De Bellis et al., Psychiatric Co-Morbidity in Caregivers and Children
Involved in Maltreatment: A Pilot Research Study with Policy Implications, 25 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 923, 924-25 (2001).
112. See LINDA MERZ-PEREZ & KATHLEEN M. HEIDE, ANIMAL CRUELTY: PATHWAY TO
VIOLENCE AGAINST PEOPLE 30 (2003) (discussing an SPCA study indicating that animal
abusers are significantly more likely to commit violent acts against people).
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contention like abortion. While there are concerns about how these
issues will be resolved, the civil morality provides guidance for their
resolution. This guidance is not only as good as that potentially pro-
vided by religious morality, it is actually a better representation of the
true intent of the Founders, as discussed above.
A. Same-Sex Marriage
As discussed above, polygamy can clearly be banned because it
does not fit the monogamous commitment that is essential to marriage
as a component of social cohesion and good order. Just as clearly,
same-sex marriage does fit into the monogamous definition. While
homosexuality falls outside the Judeo-Christian religious norm,' 13 it is
not replete with the consent issues that plague polygamy. Homosexual
couples are equally as monogamous as heterosexual couples. 114
Indeed, given the amount of persecution that homosexuals endure and
the social hurdles they must overcome,"' the fact that homosexuals
are statistically just as monogamous as heterosexual couples may
imply that, absent such hardship, they would have an even higher rate
of monogamy.
Objections to homosexual unions generally rest almost exclu-
sively on religious grounds disguised by terms like "unnatural" and
"destructive."' 1 6 These unions are only unnatural or improper in the
sense that religion has labeled them so, and they could only be
destructive of the institution of marriage if marriage was a purely relig-
ious arrangement. However, the essence of marriage is a social com-
pact recognized by the states" 7 that two people are bound together for
life. This is deeply rooted in the civil morality concerns of social cohe-
sion and good order. Marriage of any sort acts to define and formulate
113. Leviticus 18:22.
114. Compare Steven Bryant, National Survey of Gay and Lesbian Couples, PARTNERS,
May/June 1989, available at http://www.buddybuddy.com/survey.html (finding sixty-
three percent monogamy among gay couples and ninety-one percent monogamy
among lesbian couples), with Emily A. Stone et al., Sex Differences and Similarities in
Preferred Mating Arrangements, 7 SEXUALITIES, EVOLUTION & GENDER 269, 274 (2005),
available at http://home.utah.edu/-u0525361/Offprint-final.pdf (finding that sixty
percent of heterosexual married men and seventy percent of heterosexual married
women remain monogamous).
115. Bryant, supra note 114.
116. Harold S. Martin, Homosexuality: A Sinful Way of Life, BRF WITNESS, Jan./Feb.
1981, available at http://www.brfwitness.org/Articles/1993v28n3.htm.
117. Hill v. Hill, 208 N.W. 377, 377 (Iowa 1926) ("Society has an interest in the
permanency and stability of the marriage relation; and as individuals, in entering into
the social compact ...." (quoting Knight v. Knight, 31 Iowa 451, 456 (1871))).
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the social building blocks of which larger society is composed. Under
the civil morality, the real danger to marriage and the concepts it
embodies is the ease with which couples can obtain a divorce.
The best example of following these principles is the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health." 8 The Goodridge court, faced with deciding whether same-sex
couples should be excluded from civil marriage under the Massachu-
setts constitution, analyzed the claim under a minimum scrutiny test
in which the Commonwealth needed only to show that the ban was
rationally related to a legitimate government interest." 9 Ordinarily,
such a standard strongly favors the government, but-as in Lawrence-
the court in Goodridge found that the Commonwealth's ban on homo-
sexual marriage bore no rational relation to any legitimate state inter-
est. '2 The Commonwealth unsuccessfully argued that the
government's interest in promoting heterosexual marriage as a source
of societal stability sufficient to justify the law,' 21 and ultimately the
Goodridge court decided the case in much the same way as the United
States Supreme Court decided Lawrence.1
22
In finding a state constitutional right to homosexual marriage, the
Connecticut Supreme Court went so far as to classify sexual preference
as a quasi-suspect class.' 23 This classification allowed the court to
apply intermediate scrutiny, taking it beyond Lawrence.'24 California
went even farther than that, ruling that sexual preference is a fully sus-
pect class, and therefore entitled to strict scrutiny. 125 While these
cases relied on their respective state constitutions, each cited Lawrence
extensively. This reliance seems to suggest that not only is religious
morality no longer an appropriate state interest, but the entire juris-
prudence of marriage is shifting.
B. Same-Sex Adoption
Nearly identical arguments apply to adoption. There is no credi-
ble evidence to indicate that a child adopted by a same-sex couple is
any more likely to be harmed by that adoption than a child adopted by
118. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
119. Id. at 960.
120. Id. at 967-68.
121. Id. at 965.
122. Id. at 966.
123. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008).
124. Id. at 407.
125. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5, writ of mandate issued, Strauss v.
Horton, No. S168047 (Cal. Nov. 5, 2008).
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a heterosexual couple.' 26 The commonly presented objections to
homosexual adoption are that homosexuals are more likely to sexually
abuse their children,' 2 7 and that homosexual men adopting boys or
lesbians adopting girls will "indoctrinate" the child into that lifes-
tyle.128 These objections.are unfounded, and when refuted only relig-
ious objections remain.
There is no empirical evidence available that indicates children of
same-sex couples are at greater risk for developmental or abuse
issues. 129 Studies conducted since the late 1970s have repeatedly
shown that "[c]hildren raised by lesbian mothers or gay fathers [do]
not systematically differ from other children" in any significant area of
child development.13 ° Additionally, researchers found that the sexual
preference of the parents had absolutely no effect on the gender prefer-
ences of the children. 3 ' Add to this the fact that studies have consist-
ently debunked the link between homosexuality and pedophilia, 132
and the so-called "health and welfare" justifications for preventing
adoptions by same-sex couples come unraveled.
What remains when the fallacious justifications melt away is
merely a religious bias against adoption by same-sex couples. Value
judgments aside, in the post-Lawrence jurisprudence of morality, this
is simply not enough to justify the intrusion into a same-sex couple's
right to raise children. In light of this development, the constitutional-
ity of state provisions barring same-sex adoption and marriage seems
very dubious indeed.
But, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit seems to disa-
gree. In Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Ser-
vices, the court held that Florida's ban on homosexual adoption was
constitutional, despite the decision in Lawrence.' 33 The opinion in
Lofton began by correctly noting that adoption is not a fundamental
126. Margaret Paccione-Dyszlewski, Children of Same Gender Parents: What is
Known, CHILD & ADOLESCENT BEHAV. LETTER (Brown Univ., Providence, R.I.), Jan. 14,
2008, at 5.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Matthew Cullinan Hoffman, Court: No Opt-Out of Homosexual
Indoctrination in Class for Massachusetts Parents, LIFESITENEWS.coM, Feb. 4, 2008,
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2008/feb/08020404.html.
129. Richard D. Krugman, Sexual Politics and Child Protection: They Don't Mix, 94
PEDIATRICS 45, 45 (1994).
130. Paccione-Dyszlewski, supra note 126, at 5.
131. Id.
132. Krugman, supra note 129.
133. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 806,
817 (11th Cir. 2004).
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right and that homosexuals are not considered a suspect class, and
therefore strict scrutiny would be inappropriate.134 The court then
applied a rational basis test to the proffered claims.'35
First, the Lofton court opined that Florida could have banned
homosexual couples from adopting because these families are, by defi-
nition, either fatherless or motherless. 136 Since the state acts in loco
parentis for adopted children, Florida's interest in promoting the best
interest of the child is furthered by placing children in families where
both gender roles are represented. 137 The court offered this justifica-
tion even though Florida law specifically allows adoption by single het-
erosexual individuals. 138 The court's answer to this inconsistency was
a weak offering that single heterosexuals have the "potential" to form
stable dual gender households. 1
39
The court then turned to a slightly more nuanced argument.
Since statistically the vast majority of children adopted will grow up to
be heterosexuals, banning homosexual adoption is rationally related to
the best interest of the children because they will need heterosexual
role models.' 40 The court believed that this was a sufficiently rational
reason for Florida to ban homosexual adoption.' 4 1
Given the statistical data on sexual identification in children
raised in homosexual homes,' 42 and the internal inconsistencies in the
court's reasoning, what really emerges from Lofton is an irrational
basis test serving as a subtle cover for a state's attempt to use religion
as the interest to be furthered. The Lofton court, undoubtedly aware of
its transparency, even takes pains to distinguish itself from Law-
rence.143 The Lofton court points out that Justice Kennedy specifically
stated that part of the reason for the ruling in Lawrence was that the
sexual encounter had been between two consenting adults and did not
involve children. 44 Rather than acknowledge that Kennedy was refer-
ring to the ability to consent to sexual acts, the court instead seems to
insist that a state can use religious morality as a basis for laws when
children are involved. This improper and facile attempt to limit Law-
134. Id. at 812.
135. Id. at 817.
136. Id. at 818-19.
137. Id. at 819.
138. Id. at 820.
139. Id. at 822.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Paccione-Dyszlewski, supra note 126.
143. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817.
144. Id.
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rence demonstrates resistance to its strictures, rather than acquies-
cence to the limitations intended by its authors.
C. Abortion
Perhaps one of the most controversial topics of modern American
morality is the debate over abortion. Even framing the policy issue is
contentious, with one side describing it as a woman's right to bodily
autonomy 4 5 and the other side as a child's right to live. 1 46 This issue
is so heated that people have been beaten, arrested, and even killed 147
because of it. Unfortunately, the civil morality does not put this issue
to rest. It does, however, illuminate the degree to which the imposition
of religious morality into the mix has muddied the waters.
While the civil morality does not resolve the abortion issue, it is
nonetheless helpful to view this issue through the lens of the civil
morality. On the one hand, we have the mother's own interest in bod-
ily integrity and self-determination.' 48 Weighed against these interests
are the interests of the child. 149 These interests cannot be invoked by
the child itself, and they are not likely to be invoked by the parent
seeking the abortion. It falls to the state, then, to enforce the rights of
the unborn child. While far from being settled, it seems entirely possi-
ble that a state's interest in preserving the child could be grounded on
the civil morality interests of prevention of physical harm and the pro-
motion of social cohesion. Clearly, the abortion procedure terminates
the life of the unborn child, and social cohesion is not possible if there
are no people to cohere. Thus, the demise of religious morality in the
jurisprudential sphere does not necessarily spell the end of the pro-life
position.
Religious morality and the attendant concerns have only served to
muddy the waters. Questions of the creation of the soul and when
life-intrinsically valuable life-begins are inherently religious ques-
tions, and as such they invite subjective and divisive answers. Relig-
145. See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Women, Reproductive Justice is Every Woman's Right,
http://www.now.org/issues/abortion/reproductive-justice.html#justice (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009).
146. See, e.g., Nat'l Right to Life, What is the Pro-Life Response to Abortionists'
Arguments?, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/facts/abortionresponses.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009).
147. In 1998, Dr. Barnett Slepian, a doctor who performed abortions, was killed by
a sniper-style attack in his Amherst, New York home. David Staba, Life Term for Killer
of Buffalo-Area Abortion Provider, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/06/20/nyregion/20kopp.html?_r-l.
148. Nat'l Org. For Women, supra note 145.
149. Nat'l Right to Life, supra note 146.
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ious morality has polarized the issue, and served to steer the debate
from the rational and empirical normative discussions. This debate
has focused on absolutist claims about killing and self-determination.
Rather than end the debate by foreclosing one position or the other,
the ascension of the civil morality after Lawrence is more likely to facil-
itate a reconciliation of two seemingly intractable viewpoints.
CONCLUSION
Lawrence v. Texas illuminated the difference between the purely
religious morality and the universal civil morality. Religious morality
relies on dogmatic commandments imparted from subjective religious
systems that rely on punishment/reward scenarios for enforcement.
The civil morality is composed of those universal interests that allow
social groups to cohere into stable, prosperous societies. By rejecting
laws based solely on religious morality, the Supreme Court in Law-
rence reaffirmed America's heritage as a religiously neutral republic.
Far from obliterating the use of morality as a basis for laws, Law-
rence in fact clarified the role of morality in American jurisprudence.
Lawrence recognized that the purely religious has no place in the
police power of the state, but rather that the universal morality com-
mon to all cultures should be the foundation of American law. This
application of the rational basis test is not only rational, but necessary
and overdue.
Justin P. Nichols
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